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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Chief Justice Miller, in reversing the opinion of the lower
court said: "Section 11 of the Criminal Code provides that a public offense for which the only punishment is a fines may be prosecuted by a penal action in the name of the Commonwealth. Under
this section, the Commonwealth could have proceeded by a penal
action. But the section is permissive in its terms, and does not
exclude any other form of procedure that is authorized by law.
Furthermore, section 9 of the Criminal Code provides as follows:
'All public offenses may be prosecuted by indictment, except:
'1. Offenses of public officers, where a different mode of
procedure is prosecuted by law.
'2. Offenses exclusively within the jurisdiction of justices of
the peace, or of police or city courts.
'3. Offenses arising in the militia, of which a military court
has exclusive jurisdiction."
Under section 9, the Commonwealth may proceed by indictment, or under section 11, it may institute a penal action.
In State v. Carr, 6 Oregon, 134, the court said: "A proceeding by indictment is an action at law." Furthermore, it will be
noticed that section 656 of the Kentucky Statutes does not require
that the fine shall be recovered by a penal action, but merely that
it is to recovered by action in the name of the Commonwealth.
Judgment reversed.

GOVERNMENT CONTROL.
BY CHARLES KERR, JUDGE FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT.
The established doctrine of charter contract, that is a valid
and binding agreement between the state and corporation, the
terms of which are the charter provisions, still obtains so far as
that class of corporations which are strictly private is concerned,
meaning thereby that class of corporations that exercise no public functions, as distinguished from that class denoniinated quasi
public. Corporations which are wholly and essentially public,
that is such political organizations as towns, counties, cities, and
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the like, over which the sovereign power is supreme, corporations which are brought into being at the will alone of the Legislature, between which and the State no possible contract can
exist, the power to control, regulate and amend is supreme, except where there are intervening third-party rights, acquired
before the proposed change or regulation. The consideration of
the subject of control by government then will be confined almost,
if not entirely, to that new and interesting class which we designate "Public Service" Corporations, such, for example, as railroads, telegraph, telephone, electric railways, public roads,
canals, bridges, &c.
The restricted powers of our Constitution, or at ]east the
powers of our Constitution as interpreted by the supreme coordinate branch of the government, the judiciary, which confines
public service improvements to private capital, although serving
only the public, have made the interventions of the courts on
behalf of the public they serve, a necessity. The early interpreters of our Constitution, although that instrument reserved to the
States all the powers not expressly granted to the general government, were yet of opinion that the Constitution was broad enough
to permit the construction and maintenance of certain classes of
public service corporations by government aid, such as canals,
postroads and the like, but the later interpreters, those which
gave to that instrument a strict construction, thereby reserving
as much power to the States as could be given by any sort of fair
construction, soon went to the extreme limit of denying to the
general government the right of aiding the construction or maintenance of any kind of internal improvements. Under.the early
interpreters, added, too, in part by the support of Mr. Jefferson,
the most ultra of the opposition, public roads were surveyed by
the government from Portland in Maine, to Pensacola in Florida;
from Washington, the capital of the nation, to St. Louis. in Missouri; while the Chesapeake Canrl and, I believe, the Erie Canal,
were actually constructed by the government (and not until the
accursed question of slavery dominated all questions of constitutional construction, were these powers denied the generdl government, but now, with the ghost of slavery behind us, and) so that
now with an age of all-absorbing commercialism upon us, those
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holding, or dretending to hold to the faith of the strict constructionists, have altogether abandoned the notion that the general
government cannot appropriate the public funds in aid of any sort
or kind of internal improvement. On the other hand those who
first favored such powers in the general government have now
become the conservatives, denying any such rights to the government, and grudgingly admitting the right of supervision. Thus
it will be seen, from the standpoint of the politician, there has
been no consistent stand taken or maintained by either of the two
great political parties, the right of supervision over that class of
public improvements which has been the work of private capital,
though public in character, having been, largely, the outgrowth of
the courts, and not the legislatures.
The early notion that corporations were distinct, though ficticious persons, developed about the fourteenth century, was the
outgrowth of canonical jurists. Cotemporary with this notion
were the old statutes of mortmain, which forbade religious
societies from holding lands without a royal license, which striction was gradually extended to municipal and other secular communities, since, as the old chronicle put it, these were "as perpetual as men of religion". From this class of corporations, thus
chartered, grew the custom of holding all public corporations
within the control of the sovereignty creating them. But with
respect to all other corporations there has been a great contrariety
of opinion, and the development of the principles which have
gradually abridged the charter contract notion, and built up what
is termed the reserved rights of control, and regulation on the
idea that as between the company, created by the sovereign, and
the public, which has delegated to the sovereign such powers as
it possesses, the sovereign, or State, should be impartial, and
protect alike each, the corporation and the public, from the
encroachments of the other. A common carrier, for instance,
serves only the public, why then it is argued should the State, to
which the public looks for protection charter a company with
powers sufficiently broad to enable it to become a creature of
oppression, and there be, at the same time, no powers reserved by
the government that would enable it to protect the public as
against its own creature. Therefore, while the ownership of
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property may be private, the use being public, the courts have
conceived it to be their duty to protect the public against oppression by such companies, and at the same time to sustain in the
sovereign power the right, by legislation, of supervision and
revision. To epitomise:
"Whenever any person pursues a public calling, and
sustains such relations to the public that the people must
of necessity deal with him, and are under a moral duress
to submit to his terms and he is unrestrained by law, then,
in order to,prevent extortion and abuse of his position, the
price he may charge for his services may be regulated by
law."
This theory of control was not unknown to the English
Courts. So far back as Lord Hale in his treatise De Jure Maris,
he thus discusses the subject:
"A right of franchise or privilege, that no man may
set up a common ferry for all passengers, without a prescription time out of mind, or a charter from the king. He
may make a ferry for his own use or the use of his family,
but not for the common use of all the king's subjects passing that way; because it doth in consequence tend to a
common charge, and is become a thing of public interest
and use, and every man for his passage pays a toll, which
is a common charge, and every ferry ought to be under a
public regulation, viz., that it give attendance at due times,
keep a boat in due order, and take but reasonable toll; for
if he fail in these he is finable."
And again in his "De Portibus Marls", he says:
"A man, for his own private advantage, may, in a port
or town, set up a wharf or crane, and may cranage, wharfage, housellage, pessage; for he doth no more than is lawful
for any man to do, viz: makes the most of his own * * *
If the king or subject have a public wharf, unto which all
persons that come to that port must come and unlade or
lade their goods as for the purpose, because they are the
wharfs only licensed by the king, * * * or because
there is no other wharf in that port, as it may fall out
where a port is newly erected; in tnat case there cannot be
taken arbitrary and excessive duties for cranage, wharfage, pesage, etc., neither can they be inhanced to an
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immoderate rate; but the duties must be reasonable and
moderate, though settled by the king's license or charter.
For now the wharf and crane and other conveniences are
affected with a public interest, and they cease to be juris
privati only; as if a man set out a street in new building on
his own land, it is now no longer bare private interest, but
is affected by a public interest."
Upon this point Lord Ellenborough also expressed the same
views:
"There is no doubt that the general principle is favored, both in law and justice, that every man may fix what
price he pleases upon his own property, or the use of it;
but if for a particular purpose the public have a right to
resort to his premises and make use of them, and he have
a monopoly in them for that purpose, if he will take the
benefit of that monopoly, he must, as an equivalent, perform the duty attached to it on reasonable terms."
To the same effect is Le Blanc, J.;
"But though this be private property, yet the principle
laid down by Lord Hale attaches upon it that when private
property affected with a public interest it ceases to be
juris privati only; and, in case of its dedication to such a
purpose as this, the owners cannot take arbitrary and
excessive duties, but the duties must be reasonable."
The principle expounder of this branch of the Common Law
has been Lord Hale, from whom we have quoted, and of whom a
learned American Judge once said:
"In England, even on rights of prerogative, they scan
his words with as much care as if they had been fo*ind in
Mazna Charta; and the meaning once ascertained, they do
not trouble themselves to search any further."
This principle has been followed largely in this country, and
has been no better expressed by any American jurist than Chief
Justice Waite in an early and the leading case on this subject,
Munn vs. Ills. 104 U. S., 113; 24 L. ed., 77:
"When the people of the United Colonies separated
from Great Britian, they changed the form, but not the
substance, of their government. They retained for the
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purposes of government all the powers of the British Parliament, and through their State constitutions, or other
forms of social compact, undertook to give practical effect
to such as they deemed necessary for the common good and
the security of life and property. All the powers which
they retained they committed to their respective States,
unless in express terms or by implication reserved to themselves. Subsequently, when it was found necessary to
establish a national government for national purposes, a
part of the powers of the States and of the people of the
States was granted to the people of the United States.
This grant operated as a further limitation upon the powers
of the States, so that now the governments of the States
possess all the powers of the Parliament of England, except
such as have been delegated to the United States or reserved
by the people. The reservations by the people are shown
in the prohibitions of the constitutions.
"When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with some rights or privileges which, as an
individual not affected by his relation to others, he might
retain. 'A body politic,' as aptly defined in the preamble
of the Constitution of Massachusetts, 'is a social compact
by wnich the whole people covenants with each citizen, and
each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good." This does
not confer power upon the whole people to control rights
which are purely and exclusively private. Thorhe v. R. &
B. Railroad Co., 27 Vt., 143; but it does authorize the establishment of laws requiring each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to
injure another. This is the very essence of government,
and has found expression in the maxim sic tuo ut alienum
non laedas. From this source come the police powers,
which, as was said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney in the
License Cases, 5 How., 583, 'are nothing more or less than
the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty,
*

*

*

that is to say

*

*

*

the power to govern men

and things.' Under these powers the government regulates
the conduct of its citizens one towards another, when such
regulation becomes necessary for the public good. In their
exercise it has been customary in England from time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to
to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers,
millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, &c., and in so doing to
fix a maximum of charge to be made for services rendered,
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accommodations furnished, and articles sold. To this day,
statutes are to be found in many of the States upon some
or all these subjects; and we think it has never yet been
successfully contended that such legislation came within
any of the constitutional prohibitions against interference
with private property."
Discussing the general principle of legislative control, and
distinguishing between those private regulations which are
peculiarly the provinces of the courts, and those which come
within the scope of legislative control. this same judge continues:
"Undoubtedly, in more private contracts, relating to
matters in which the public has no interest, what is reasonable must be ascertained judicially. But this is because the
legislature has no control over such a contract. So, too,
in matters which do affect the public interest, and as to
which legislative control may be exercised, if there are no
statutory regulations upon the subject, the courts must
determine what is reasonable. The controlling fact is the
power to regulate at all. If that exists, the right to establish the maximum of charge, as one of the means of regulation, is implied. In fact, the common-law rule, which
requires the charge to be reasonable, is itself a regulation
as to price. Without it the owner could make his rates at
will, and compel the public to yield to his terms, or forego
the use.
"But a mere common-law regulation of trade or business may be changed by statute. A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law.
That is only one of the forms of municipal law, and is no
more sacred than any other. Rights of property which
have been created by the common law cannot be taken
away without due process: but the law itself, as a rule of
conduct, may be changed at the will, or even at the whim,
of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations. Indeed, the great office of statutes is to remedy
defects in the common law as they are developed, and to
adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances. To
limit the rate of charge for services rendered in a public
employment, or for the use of property in which the public
has an interest, is only changing a regulation which existed
before. It establishes no new principle in the law, but
only gives a new effect to an old one."
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The trend of the later decisions, however, with the unprecedented growth and expansion of these institutions has been to
regulate under the general police powers of the State or government, those powers being inalienable and reserved beyond impairment. Indeed a corporation can no longer be said to possess
special rights and privileges so far as the operation of the police
power of the government is concerned, these institutions, under
the general wvelfare clause of every State Constitution, being
treated as any private individual would be treated, any legislative
act being intended for the common benefit of all, whether individuals or corporations.
Another specific right of control, too, is embraced in that
clsss of offenses growing out of ultra virus acts on the part of the
corporation, in that it has done some act not authorized by the
law creating it, or not embraced in its charter; over such acts the
right of control, both in the courts and legislatures is complete.
But the doctrine of vested rights, taught by the famous Dartmouth case, has not been wholly eliminated, some traces of that
famous case still remaining, but it must be admitted the modification has been radical, both under the doctrine of police power and
reserved rights of the legislature. A recent author discussing
this feature of recent decisions thus comments on this departure:
"It has been held that the doctrine that a charter is a
contract does not prevent the operation of the police power
in so far as it is exercised to protect peace, safety, health
and morals. The constitutions of several states (California,
Mississippi, Missouri, Louisiana, Montana, Pennsylvania),
express this principle in another form by providing that
the police power shall never be so abridged as to permit
corporations to conduct their business so as to infringe the
rights of individuals or the general well-being of the state.
A railroad company cannot therefore set up its charter to
escape the operation of a law compelling it to adopt certain
safeguards calculated to prevent accidents, and the charter
right of an electric company to place its wires under the
streets of a city is subject to reasonable municipal regulations as to the method of exercising that right; the charter
of a lottery or a brewing company does not prevent subsequent legislation to suppress lotteries or the manufacture
of intoxicating liquors. For as the government cannot
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part with its power to guard against disorder, disease, or
the corruption of morals, a contract purporting to do this
is void ab initio, and it is possible to speak of the impairment of the obligation of a contract where the contract is
illegal. Corporations are therefore fully subject to the
operation of the police power in the narrower sense of the
term, and must submit to such regulations and restraints
as are called for by the safety, health, or morals of the
It
community, notwithstanding any charter provisions.
has even been intimated by the United States Supreme
Court that there is implied in the charter of every corporation the condition that the corporation shall be subject to
such reasonable regulations in respect to the general conduct of its affairs as the legislature may from time to time
prescribe, which do not materially interfere with the substantial enjoyment of the privileges the state has granted,
and serve only to secure the ends for which the corporation
was created."
To the same effect are the recent decisions of the Supreme
Court, as was said in Pearsall vs. Great Northern Railroad, 161
U. S. 646, Sup. Ct. Rep. 705, 40 L. ed. 838.
"Nor does it follow, from the fact that the contract
evidenced by the charter cannot be impaired, that the
power of the legislature over such charter is wholly taken
away, since statutes which operate only to regulate the
the manner in which the franchises are to be exercised, and
which do not interfere substantially with the enjoyment of
the main object of the grant, are not open to the objections
of impairing the contract.
"A familiar instance of this class of legislation is that
enacted under what is known as the police power. In
virtue of this the State may prescribe regulations contributing to the comfort, safety and health of passengers, the
protection of the public at highway crossings or eleewhere,
the security of owners of adjacent property, by requiring
the track to be fenced, and such appliances to be annexed
to the engines as shall prevent the communication of fire to
neighboring buildings. Cooley Print. Const. Law, 321.
This power, as was said by Mr. Justice Miller in the Slaughter-house cases, 16 Wall., 36, 62, is and must be, from its
very nature, incapable of any very exact definition, or limitation. 'Upon it depends the security of social order, the
life and health of the citizen, the comfort of existence in a
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thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and
social life, and the beneficial use of property.
And also in a similar case from Kentucky in L. & N. R. R.
vs. Kentucky, 161 U. S., 677, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 714, 40 L. ed. 840:
"Under its police power the people, in their sovereign
capacity, or the legislature, as their representatives, may
deal with the charter of a railway corporation, so far as is
necessary for the protection of the lives, health and safety
of its passengers or the public, or for the security of property or the conservation of the public interests, provided,
of course, that no vested rights are thereby impaired. In
other words, the legislature may not destroy vested rights,
whether they are expressly prohibited from doing so or not,
but otherwise may legislate with respect to corporations,
whether expressly permitted to do so or not. While the
police power has been most frequentiy exercised with
respect to matters which concern the public health, safety
or morals, we have frequently held that corporations engaged in a public service are subject to legislative control,
so far as it becomes necessary for the protection of the
public interests."
And also in the still more recent case of Hale vs. Henkel,
201 U. S. 43, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, 50 L. ed. 652:
"Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of
the State. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and
franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the State
and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited
by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its
charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long ag it obeys the laws of its creation.
There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its
contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers.
It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a State, having
chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises,
could not in the exercise of its sovereignty inquire how
these franchises had been employed, and whether they had
been abused, and demand the production of the corporate
books and papers for that purpose."
Thus it will be seen the famous Dartmouth College case has
been so modified, so far as legitimate state control is concerned,
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that the law has been left very much where it would have been
left if there had been no Dartmouth College case, as was
expressed by Justice Bradley in a dissenting opinion rendered in
the Sinking Fund cases (91 U. S., 77.)
As a result of this development there is now little constitutional difference between corporations and individuals; and with
respect to public service corporations the L. & N. case has clearly
put them under the police control of the sovereignty creating
them, or the sovereignty where they may see cause to do'
business.
The chief value of the Dartmouth College case lies in the
principle that the fact of incorporation does not place the corporation or its property at the mercy of the government. The mischief,
of that case, which treated mere organization as a vested right,
and gave to it privileges with respect to legislative control not
exercised over individuals, has been gradually overcome by the
process of adjudication. But whether the pendulum of governmental control may not swing to as great extreme on the one
hand, as has the abuse of corporate privileges on the other is one
of the serious problems of the hour.
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